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Abstract: Workflow Management Systems (WfMSs) are used to support the modeling and
coordinated execution of business processes within an organization or across
organizational boundaries. Although some research efforts have addressed requirements
for authorization and access control for workflow systems, little attention has been paid
to the requirements as they apply to application data accessed or managed by WfMSs. In
this paper, we discuss key access control requirements for application data in workflow
applications using examples from the healthcare domain, introduce a classification of
application data used in workflow systems by analyzing their sources, and then propose a
comprehensive data authorization and access control mechanism for WfMSs.  This
involves four aspects: role, task, process instance-based user group, and data content.
For implementation, a predicate-based access control method is used. We believe that the
proposed model is applicable to workflow applications and WfMSs with diverse access
control requirements.
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1. Introduction
Workflow management systems (WfMSs) are widely used in numerous application
domains. Workflow activities (or tasks) and transitions are components of workflow
applications that capture and represent business process and business logic. According to
the Workflow Management Coalition’s Workflow Reference Model [H94], data used in
workflow systems can be divided into three kinds: control data, workflow relevant data,
and application data. Workflow control data is maintained by the workflow enactment
service to identify the state of individual process or activity instances or other status
information. Workflow relevant data is used by the WfMS to determine the state
transition of a workflow process instance. Usually, both of these two kinds of data are not
accessible, or only accessible in a very limited way, by ordinary users. Hence the access
control policy for both of them is relatively simple. While workflow application data is
application specific and every user may use it; its access control requirements may
become very complicated in many applications.
Many access control requirements [BBFR98] exist for workflow applications and
WfMSs. However, the access control and authorization requirements for data involved in
applications managed by WfMSs have not received much attention. We focus on
authorization and access control of workflow application data in this paper.
    Until recently, many WfMSs did not manage application data directly, but left
that to the application systems themselves. A case in point is the reference model [H94]
of WfMC in which security of application data at the workflow level has not been
discussed. Unfortunately, in such a situation, the security protection of application data
may be compromised. In the example that we will discuss in Section 3, some
requirements (such as Regulations 1 and 3) cannot be met if the WfMS does not provide
an access control mechanism for them. Therefore, we believe a workflow-level access
control mechanism is necessary for many workflow applications.
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    The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief background
and related work in this area. In Section 3, we discuss access control requirements for
application data that should be supported by WfMSs and illustrate them using a
healthcare workflow example. Four major aspects for access control are identified. In
Section 4, a comprehensive access control model is presented. Section 5 discusses an
approach for implementing the access control model. The key idea is to use a predicate-
based access control method [BM82, CFMS95] and a repository to manage the metadata
of workflow processes. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background and Related work
The next three paragraphs of this section introduce useful terminology and concepts,
followed by related work.  
A business process (or process in short) is a set of one or more linked tasks or
activities that collectively realize a business objective or policy goal, normally within the
context of an organizational structure defining functional roles and relationships. Usually,
a workflow process is developed in two phases by using corresponding services of a
WfMS. They are workflow creation (designing or building) and workflow enactment
(execution or runtime). During the creation phase, process definitions are specified.
During the enactment phase, instances of process definitions are executed.
    One concept relevant to process enactment is process instance-based user group. There
may exist many instances of the same process definition running concurrently under the
control of the workflow enactment service. A process instance may involve several
human users, who form the user group for that process instance. Because every process
instance is created and executed at run time, the corresponding user group that is
involved in a particular process instance only exists at run time when the process instance
is being executed. What is more, usually we cannot know all the members of any group
until all the tasks of a process instance have been started. Two major reasons are as
follows: Firstly, when starting to execute a new task in a process instance, the WfMS has
to select a suitable user to execute it. The decision of such a selection process can be
affected by many factors: eligible users/roles to execute this task which are specified at
build time, the users available when the selection process is carried out, the selection
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policy of the WfMS, and so on. Secondly, each process instance may need to execute a
different subset of all tasks defined in the workflow process definition, or may execute in
different sequences, which depends on various factors as well.
 Typically, the whole workflow process is very complicated and it is necessary to
define it as a collection of tasks. There are data and control dependency relationships
among these tasks. WfMC [WfMC96] considers two kinds of tasks, automated and
manual. While in some commercial products or research systems, more kinds of tasks are
introduced. For example, METEOR [SKMW96, SK99], a WfMS developed at the Large
Scale Distributed Information Systems (LSDIS) Lab, University of Georgia, supports
some more kinds of tasks such as transactional, non-transactional, compound (network),
two-phase commit, manual and so on. A process can be composed hierarchically through
compound tasks to effectively manage complexity. That is, a compound task itself is a
subworkflow. Therefore, tasks can be organized in the form of complex hierarchical
structure.
Now we discuss some of the related work.  Access control is one of the important
aspects that provide the foundation for information and system security [SS96]. Several
kinds of access control models have been proposed for operating systems, database
systems, and various kinds of information systems. Among them, role-based access
control (RBAC) model is both important and popular. The concept of RBAC began with
multi-user and multi-application on-line systems pioneered in the 1970s [SCFY96]. Now
it has been used extensively in many kinds of information systems and with diversified
enhancements in functionality. Another kind of access control model that will be used in
this paper is predicate-based access control [CFMS95, BM82].
    For workflow security, previous research has been done mainly on several
aspects, which include task assignment constraints, inter-workflow security, and
multilevel secure workflow systems [B01]. Using task assignment constraints,
assignment methods for the workflow systems are specified in terms of constraints on the
permissible assignments of users to tasks and roles. Because the role-based model is a
natural choice for implementing security in workflow systems, most of the discussions
are based on that. Bertino et al. [BFA99] proposed a formal logical authorization model
for assigning users and roles to tasks, with both static and dynamic authorization
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constraints. Castano et al. [CCF01] proposed a rule-based model. In their model, the
constraints can apply to a specific instance or all instances of a process definition. Time
constraints are also supported. Atluri and Huang’s work in [AH96a] focused on using
Petri Nets to present an authorization model.
    Inter-workflow security is concerned with the security of the communication and
cooperation of autonomous workflow systems, running at different units of the same
organizations or at different organizations. Some related work can be found in
[WfMC98], [MFWA99], and [VA98].
    Multi-level secure workflow is a part of inter-workflow security. This rich
research area is explored, among others by the Workflow Management Coalition
[WfMC98], Miller et. al. [MFWA99], Kang et al. [KFSK99], and Atluri et al. [AHB97,
AHB01], Atluri and Huang [AH96b].
    Castano et. al. [CCF01] present a summary of security adopted in commercial
workflow systems, which including IBM MQSeries, Staffware2000, InConcert, and
Cosa. All these products provide certain kinds of security mechanisms for supporting task
assignment constraints. IBM MQSeries, Staffware2000, and Cosa allow duty constraint
binding, while InConcert allows external applications that are invoked at task assignment
time to determine the role-to-task assignment.
    Data access control is another issue that needs to be considered for WfMS
security. However, in many cases, this issue has not been mentioned [B00]. To our
knowledge, [AH96a] is the only one that has considered this issue. In their paper, Atluri
and Huang proposed an authorization model for workflow systems. Two aspects, role and
task, are considered. However, their work does not distinguish between the types of data
involved. This paper is focused on introducing an adequate access control mechanism for
workflow systems to protect application data. Besides role and task, other aspects such as
process instance-based user group and content need to be considered for access control of
application data. Furthermore, some implementation-related issues need to be considered
as well. For example, in workflow systems, application data could be managed either by
the WfMS or by other application systems. How to address this problem has to be
considered. Understanding real-world application requirements through efforts to apply
technology in partnership with industry is critical in developing practical and useful
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approaches and techniques.  At the LSDIS lab we have had significant partnerships
involving technology development, prototyping, trialing and commercialization involving
the METEOR project and the healthcare, defense and telecommunications industries
[SKMW96, SWK+97, KSM99, IC].
In the rest of this paper, we will discuss access control requirements identifiable in a
healthcare workflow application, and then follow up with a comprehensive access control
model to meet these requirements. 
3. Access control requirements in WfMSs
In this section, we discuss some access control requirements in the context of an
information intensive healthcare workflow application [RT97]. Medical records contain a
great deal of data about people, such as height and weight, blood pressure, and notes
about bouts with the flu, cuts, or broken bones. These records may also contain some
sensitive information of people such as fertility and abortions, emotional problems and
psychiatric care, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV status, substance abuse, physical
abuse, genetic predisposition to diseases, and so on. Access to this information must be
carefully controlled [RT97]. Now let us discuss some application requirements to
illustrate what the new challenges are for access control mechanisms in workflow
systems.
    The top-level tasks of a healthcare workflow process are shown in Figure 1 using
the METEOR workflow builder tool [SWK+97]. Among all top-level tasks, Check,
Diagnosis, and Payment are compound tasks, and all other tasks are manual tasks.
Various roles and their dominance relationships are given in Figure 2. If role ri
dominates role rj, then there is an arc from rj to ri . In the role hierarchy, a Physician can
be an Internist, a Surgeon, a Pediatrician, a Gynecologist, a Psychiatrist, or a
Venerologist. Surgeons can be further divided into several subtypes. The role-task
assignment relationship is stipulated in the following way: A Receptionist can undertake
both tasks of Appointment and Register; Check is required to be undertaken by Nurse;
Physician is specified to execute Diagnosis and ReferToSpecialist; both
MedicineConsulting and MedicineDispensing are executed by Pharmacist; X_ray and
Ultrasound are undertaken by related specialists, respectively.
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    A hospital has many departments. Each type of physicians belongs to the
corresponding department, e.g., all Surgeons (General) belong to the General Surgery
Department. 
Figure 1: Task and their relationships in healthcare workflow process
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Figure 2: Role hierarchy for healthcare workflow process
Figure 3. Data structure in healthcare workflow process
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   The hospital maintains a hospital-wide HealthCareRecord table (also called
Master Patient Index, [SKMW96]) that records some basic information of all patients
who have been treated or are being treating by the hospital. Every department has its own
healthcare record tables. Upon every visit of a patient, a new “encounter” record is
inserted into the table corresponding to the department of the physician who treats the
patient. When a patient checks in, the receptionist checks if the patient’s records are in
the HealthCareRecord table. If the patient does not have a record in the
HealthCareRecord table (that means this is his/her first visit to the hospital), the
receptionist first creates a new record in the HealthCareRecord table for that patient, then
creates a new record in the department table (such as Internal Medicine or Pediatrics). If
the patient does, the receptionist just creates a new record in the corresponding
department table for the patient. For those patients who are treated now in the hospital,
they have current records in the department tables. For those patients who have finished
their treatments, the hospital keeps their medical records for a certain period of time.
Such records are called historical records. Current and historical records of patients are
kept in separate tables, which are current healthcare record and historical healthcare
record, for every department. A patient may have more than one (historical) medical
record in different department tables. Figure 3 shows a general HealthCareRecord table
for the whole hospital and four tables used by two departments, Internal Medicine and
Psychiatry. The structures of these tables are given in the Appendix. This example will be
used throughout the paper.
Assuming the process shown in Figure 1 is used by all departments in the
hospital3, we will discuss some regulations that the hospital may stipulate and means by
which the workflow system could support them effectively.
3.1 Process instance-based user group
Regulation 1. For every patient’s visit there is a group of healthcare professionals who
are involved in the treatment of that patient. Such a group may consist of one (or several)
physician, one (or several) nurse and some other personnel. This situation is much easier
to observe especially for inpatients. To maintain as much privacy as possible, it is
                                                          
3 In practice, it is possible that special workflow processes are needed for some departments due to their
particularities. However, it is a better choice for most departments to share the same process.
Wu, S. et al. Authorization and Access Control of Application Data in Workflow Systems
10
stipulated that only a member of the group treating that patient is allowed to check the
patient’s current medical record when performing the tasks assigned to him/her.
Discussion:   This regulation is based on process instance-based user group. A physician,
a nurse or a receptionist may be involved in the treatments of several patients, and
therefore, take part in several medical groups at the same time. Role-based or
discretionary access control does not suffice in such situations. So it is necessary for the
workflow system to support the concept of process instance-based user group, or user
group for short.
3.2  Data content
Regulation 2. When performing the Diagnosis task, a physician d can browse all
historical healthcare records of
• the patient p that d is treating (may include those records of p that were not treated by
d; some more restrictions are discussed in Regulation 5 below), and
• those cases of other patients besides p the physician d treated before.
Discussion: A major difficulty with this requirement is due to the large amount of
historical healthcare records. Usually, in a hospital there are thousands of patient
healthcare records. Using access control tabulation with every healthcare record as a
single controlled object is not a good solution. Because in such a way, we have to keep a
huge set of tuples for the access control tabulation, even more tuples than that of the
healthcare records themselves.
    An effective way to solve this problem is using predicate-based access control [CFMS
95, BM82]. We put some related information such as names and employee numbers of
physicians along with the patient’s records. We use a predicate that specifies “a
physician can query those healthcare records in which the physician’s ID (an attribute of
healthcare record) equals his/her ID”. In such a way, just one rule can substitute for
many records in the access control tabulation. Thus, we need the access control
mechanism to support predicate-based access control.
3.3 Task
Regulation 3. A pharmacist can perform two tasks. One is to dispense medicine for a
patient according to the prescription of a physician. In this task, he/she cannot read any
Wu, S. et al. Authorization and Access Control of Application Data in Workflow Systems
11
medical record of that patient. The other is to provide medicine consultation for
physicians. For an effective consultation, he/she needs to know some related information
about that patient. So when performing that task, he/she is allowed to read those records
of the patient that the physician who consults him/her can read.
Discussion: When performing different tasks, a pharmacist needs to be given different
privileges. Therefore, task should be a factor in the access control mechanism.
3.4 Privilege propagation
Also, in Regulation 3 (refer to Regulation 1 as well), another issue is that different
physicians may consult the same pharmacist; thus, a pharmacist needs to have different
privileges in different situations, even while performing the same task,
MedicineConsulting. Such privileges cannot be decided statically at build time as usual4.
Hence, we need a privilege propagation function from one role to another role in certain
circumstances.
3.5 Role
Regulation 4. When performing the Check task, a nurse can read the current record of
the patient. Besides, she can add some related items, such as the reading of pulse rate or
blood pressure of the patient into the record as well, but she cannot read any other records
except the one she is working with. Similar restrictions apply to Receptionist when he/she
performs task Register.
Discussion: From Regulations 1, 2 and 4, we can see that on the one hand, even in the
same process instance group, different roles such as Nurse and Physician may have
different privileges. On the other hand, different users who play the same role, but are
involved in different process instances will need different privileges. Therefore, role and
process instance-based user group are two distinct concepts. Neither of them can act as a
substitute for the other.
                                                          
4 A decomposition of the related task is a solution without introducing new functions for access control
mechanism. For example, we can decompose MedicineConsulting into InternalMedicineConsulting,
SurgeryMedicineConsulting and so on. But in this example, if the hospital has 20 departments, we must add
19 extra tasks.
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3.6 Dynamic authorization
Regulation 5. The historical medical records of most departments (except Gynecology,
Venereology, and Psychiatry) can be shared by all physicians to some extent.
Specifically, when a physician treats a patient, he/she can read the historical medical
records of that patient in most departments besides his/her own. However, the medical
records of Gynecology, Venereology, and Psychiatry cannot be read unless the patient
agrees to this.
Regulation 6. In the treatment of a patient, some members of his/her medical group may
be changed from one healthcare provider to another. The successor must get the same
privilege as his/her predecessor.
Discussion: Typically, authorizations are defined at build time, so a workflow designer
decides the exact relationships among users, roles, process instance-based user groups,
tasks, and objects. The above two regulations show that such designing and changing
functions are needed at run time as well. In Regulation 5, it is necessary to define new
access control rules, and in Regulation 6, it is necessary to change user/role assignment at
run time. For supporting these regulations, all related information must be kept in such a
way that dynamic changes are allowable at run time. Consistency is the key concern for
making changes when many process instances are running. As adaptive and dynamic
workflow is an important aspect in workflow systems [SK99, SO99], dynamic
authorization is surely a part of it that needs to be supported. However, in this paper we
do not intend to discuss the detailed solution to this problem because it is rather
implementation-oriented.
    We conclude this section with some discussion of general requirements for the access
control mechanism over application data in workflow systems. From the healthcare
workflow application we discovered quite a few access control requirements. All
regulations discussed in this section have to be enforced at the same time. This cannot be
achieved by any current workflow system, nor by any access control model proposed so
far. We expect that many of these access control requirements not only exist in the
healthcare application, but also in many other workflow application fields. 
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    In some situations, e.g., a database system or a file management system is used by the
workflow system to store its application data, some of the access control requirements at
the workflow level can be met by enforcing adequate access control rules in the database
system or file management system. However, some of the requirements cannot be met
without a workflow level security mechanism. In the above example, some regulations
(such as Regulations 1 and 3) cannot be met if the WfMS does not provide an access
control mechanism for them. So a workflow-level access control mechanism is necessary
for managing application data.
    Role is an important concept for organizational and security models and is extensively
used in many kinds of software systems. This is also the case for workflow systems.
    Process instance-based user groups are definitely needed to support cooperation among
a group of people to complete a job (process instance). Besides the healthcare field, many
other kinds of applications such as banking, insurance, legal & law enforcement,
immigration, have similar access control requirements. Investment processes in a bank,
case investigation for damage claims in an insurance company, case judgement in a court
proceeding, and immigration application processing in a nation’s immigration service,
typically need more than one person’s efforts. Letting just the party concerned, but not
anyone else, to access the information they need is a general security principle. So
process instance-based user group makes excellent sense. 
    Task is another important aspect. Even with roles and process instance-based user
groups, authorization cannot be specified in an accurate manner. A user usually may need
to access different information when he/she is performing different tasks. So including
task designation can make the authorization and access control model in better accord
with the least privilege principle. On the other hand, just supporting task designation is
not enough as well, because different users (e.g., doctors/nurses) may need different
privileges when performing the same task (e.g., diagnosis/check). Therefore, we have the
following observations about workflow-level access control mechanisms for application
data: 
• Process instance-based user group, task, and role are three important aspects that the
access control mechanism of workflow systems need to support simultaneously.
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• Data contents need to be considered when a workflow application includes a large
amount of application data, as in the healthcare workflow application.
• The problem of privilege propagation may be encountered in some situations, so it is
useful for the access control model to support it.
• Dynamic authorization is an important aspect of adaptive workflow systems that
needs further work.
4. A comprehensive access control model
In this section, we will present a comprehensive access control model to meet the
requirements (except dynamic authorization) discussed in Section 3. As a preparation, let
us introduce some notations and assumptions about WfMS first. Based on that, we will
describe all the components used, then present the access control model, and discuss
some related authorization rules and specifications. Examples from the healthcare
application will be given to explain how the model works.
    A process instance is a single enactment of a process definition, including its
associated data. We distinguish different process instances by assigning a unique ID to
each of them. Every running process instance has a set of relevant variables to represent
their enactment state. Many variables are defined by the workflow system automatically.
For example, the ID of a process instance, the user group of a particular process instance,
the performer of every task in a process instance, and so on. Such environment variables
are called system variables. Some examples of environment variables are:
• #ThisInstance.ID – It denotes the current process instance’s ID (the process instance
that the user is being involved is called current process instance).
• #ThisTask.Name – The current task’s name (the task that the user is performing is
called the current task).
• #ThisRole.Name – The role name that the user is playing.
• #ThisUser.ID – The ID of the user.
    We also assume that a workflow designer can define additional variables in a process
definition. For instance, in a healthcare workflow application, we can define a variable
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PatientID for it. Such variables are called user-defined variables. Then at any time when a
process instance is executed, the user can access all these variables. 
4.1 Components
The access control model relies on the following components:
4.1.1 Subject
The first component is subject that includes role, user, and process instance-based user
group. We have a set of users U. Each user is a member of it. Roles are named collection
of privileges and represent organizational agents intending to perform certain job
functions within an organization. Roles are hierarchically organized in an organization.
We use R to indicate a set of roles ri (1≤i≤n) and <R to indicate a role hierarchy. Let ri, rj
∈ R be roles. We say that ri dominates rj in the hierarchy (ri <R rj), if ri precedes rj in the
ordering. Figure 2 is an example of role hierarchy in the healthcare workflow application.
There is a many-to-many relationship between users and roles to indicate which user can
play which role.
    A process instance-based user group includes all the users who are involved in a
particular process instance. It is dynamic because for any process instance, all the user-
task assignments are done at run time. So when the process instance keeps running, more
and more users will be added to the user group of that process instance. There is a many-
to-many relationship between users and process instance-based user groups.    
4.1.2 Task
The second component is task. Tasks are organized as a tree in the workflow process. We
use a tree T to indicate a set of tasks with a relation <T to indicate task hierarchy. For
tasks ti, tj ∈ T, we say that ti includes tj in the hierarchy (ti <T tj), if tj is a sub-task of ti in
the workflow process. An example of task hierarchy in the healthcare workflow process
is shown in Figure 4 (with some tasks omitted for brevity).
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4.1.3 Object
The third component is object. Each object o ∈ O includes a set of objects {o1, o2, …,
on}.  For any o ∈ O, we define a group of attributes security-attri(o) to describe the
access control-related properties of o. Every attribute in security-attri(o) is called a
security attribute of o. Such an object definition is general and is adequate for defining
diversified kinds of data and files. We can treat a set of document files, a set of
audio/video files, a set of executable files, a class of objects in an object-oriented
database, a relation instance in a relational database, or even all relation instances in a
database as an object o ∈ O.
    Next, we introduce a classification for application data. It is especially helpful for
supporting process instance-based access control automatically. The classification is from
a particular workflow process’s point of view. We divide application data into two types,
exogenous and endogenous. Endogenous data refer to those data that are generated by the
process instances of this process. They can be further divided into two subtypes historical
and current. Historical data refer to those data that are produced by the process
instances—which have been completed and do not exist any more. We call such process
instances finished process instances. Current data refer to those data that are produced by
the instances of this process—which are being executed and continue to exist for some
All Tasks
Appointment Register
Create or Get
Patient Record
Check
Eligibility
Diagnosis Payment
Add Patient
Record
Prescription
Patient Insurance
Company
Figure 4. An example of task hierarchy
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time. We call such process instances running process instances. Exogenous data refer to
those data that come from the outside of this workflow process.
    We adopt three domains, current, historical, and exogenous, to store different types
of data. For any object o ∈ O, they must belong to one and only one of these domains. In
our model, we wish to support process instance-based access control automatically only
in the current domain. Two major reasons are as follows. Firstly, application data in the
current domain need such an access control mechanism much more than those in either
the historical domain or exogenous domain. Secondly, it can be implemented
automatically only for data in the current domain. Because objects in the current domain
are created by currently active process instances of the process definition, the workflow
system can identify which process instance creates them without human intervention. For
historical and exogenous data, determining which objects could be accessed by users in
which process instance is very difficult. However, if necessary, similar access control
rules can be enforced for historical and exogenous data by using content-based access
control.  For supporting process instance-based access control, every object o ∈ O in the
current domain gets a security attribute ProcessInstanceID automatically.  
4.1.4 Constraint
The fourth component is constraint. C is a set of constraints. Each constraint is a Boolean
expression with the following syntax:
<Boolean-expression> ::= <conjunctive-item>  {OR <conjunctive-item>}
<conjunctive-item > ::= <compare-predicate> {AND <compare-predicate>}
<compare-predicate> ::= <left-value> <operator> <right-value>
<left-value> ::= <security-attribute-variable>
<right-value> ::= <constant> | <workflow-system-environment-variable> 
| < security-attribute-variable >
<operator> ::= ‘=’ | ‘!=’ | ‘<>’ | ‘>’ | ‘<’ | ‘>=’ | ‘<=’ 
These elements are mostly self-explanatory. Some additional explanation is in order for
the basic operands and operators.
• A constant can be any type of string, float, integer, etc.; 
• The current process’s ID, the performer of the current task are examples of workflow
system environment variables;
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• A security attribute variable is an attribute in set security-attri(o) of an object o ∈ O.
We use rel(c) to denote the set of all objects o ∈ O whose security attributes appear
in constraint c as attribute variables. Because c is always with a particular object o in
an authorization, any valid c in C the following two conditions must be hold at the
same time: (a) ∃o (o ∈ O ∧ o ∈ rel(c)); and (b) ¬∃(o1, o2) (o1 ∈ O ∧ o2 ∈ O ∧ o1 ≠ o2
∧ {o1, o2} ⊆ rel(c)). That is to say, one and only one object’s security attributes may
appear in any c ∈ C.
• Both the left and right sides of a <compare-predicate> need to be of same data type.
All the operators can be used for numerical comparison, but for string comparison,
only two operators ‘=’ and ‘!=’ can be used.
4.1.5 Privilege
The last component is a set of privileges (or access rights) P, which indicates the access
modes subjects can exercise on the objects. Although adjustable, we illustrate with eight
types of privileges: select, update, delete and insert for database objects, read, edit,
destroy, and new for document files.
4.2 Access control model
The access control model is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 1. The access control model consists of the following components and
relationships among those components:
• U, R, T, O, C and P represent user, role, task, object, constraint, and privilege,
respectively as introduced in Section 4.1;
• RoleHierarchy ⊆ R×R is a partial order on R called the role dominance relationship.
<R is used to represent that relationship;
• TaskTree ⊆ T× T is a partial order on T called the task inclusion relationship. We
use <T to represent the inclusion relationship.
• UserRoleAssignment ⊆ U×R is a many-to-many user to role assignment
relationship. 
• RoleTaskAssignment ⊆ R×T is a many-to-many role to task authorization
relationship.
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• All objects in O are divided into three types (domains): current, historical and
exogenous. Any object o∈O belongs to one and only one of the above three types
(domains).
• ObjectPrivilege ⊆ O×P is a many-to-many object to privilege possession
relationship.
• PermissionAssignment1 ⊆ RoleTaskAssignment×ObjectPrivilege×C is a
permission relationship from role and task to object and access privilege (select, read,
update, edit, delete or destroy) with a certain constraint.
• PermissionAssignment2 ⊆ RoleTaskAssignment×ObjectPrivilege is a permission
relationship from role and task to object and access privilege (insert, new, select,
read, update, edit, delete or destroy).
4.3 Authorization rules and specifications
4.3.1 Authorization rules
In our authorization mechanism, an authorization is a 5-tuple (r, t, o, p, c) or a 4-tuple (r,
t, o, p) where r ∈ R, t ∈ T, o ∈ O, p ∈ P, c ∈ C, (r, t) ∈ RoleTaskAssignment, and (o,
p) ∈ ObjectPrivilege.
    Tuple (r, t, o, p, c) indicates that any user who plays role r is authorized to exercise
privilege p on some restricted objects in set object o when he/she performs task t. If o ∈
O belongs to the historical or exogenous domain, then the Boolean expression in c must
be satisfied for these component objects in o. If o ∈ O belongs to the current domain,
then c’ = c and cpi must be satisfied. Here cpi becomes true if the user is a member of the
user group of the current process instance. In such a way process instance-based access
control can be supported automatically.
    Two situations need to be considered.
• p = insert (new):  any user who plays role r is authorized to insert new tuples into o
(assuming o is a relation instance in a database), or create a new document file in o
(assuming o is a set of document files) when performing task t;
• p = select (read), or update (edit), or delete (destroy): For data in either historical or
exogenous domain, any user who plays role r is authorized to exercise privilege p on
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all tuples (or document files) of o when performing task t. For data in the current
domain, constraint cpi must be satisfied for those tuples.
Example 1.  The definition of the HealthCareRecord object is given in the Appendix.
Tuple (Internist, Diagnosis, HealthCareRecord, select, PatientName = “John Smith”)
states that when performing the Diagnosis task, any internist is authorized to query those
tuples with “John Smith” being their patient’s name in the HealthCareRecord table. 
    Besides explicit authorizations, additional authorizations can be derived through the
following rules.
1. An authorization given to a role r in performing task t propagates to all roles which
precede r in the role hierarchy (that is, to all roles r’ such that r’ <R r). 
2. An authorization given to a role r in performing task t propagates to all sub-tasks that
are included in t (that is, to all tasks t’ such that t’ <T t).
4.3.2 Some specifications about authorizations
There is a close relationship between two kinds of authorizations in the workflow system.
One is RoleTaskAssignment that stipulates which role is allowed to execute a given
task, the other is PermissionAssignment (including PermissionAssignment1 and
PermissionAssignment2) that stipulates which role is allowed to access which object
within a certain task provided that role is permitted to perform that task. In this paper, we
mainly discuss the latter. Obtaining the privilege of executing a task is a prerequisite for a
user to access data in that task. What is more, if a user undertakes a particular task, but
not any other task, then he/she is eligible to access data stipulated by data authorization
for that particular task. In Definition 1, the consistency of two kinds of authorizations can
be guaranteed by specifying RoleTaskAssignment, but not Role×Task as components of
PermissionAssignment1 and PermissionAssignment2.
    In this current work, to reduce the complexity of the access control model, only
positive authorizations are considered, so no explicit authorization conflict occur. For a
user who plays one role, he/she will possess the union of privileges of those authorization
tuples for that role.
    Different WfMSs may have their own ways to define task assignment. Some research
has been done on this issue [BFA99, CCF95, AH96a] to support various kinds of
constraints. In this paper, both UserRoleAssignment and RoleTaskAssignment are used
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for that purpose. If necessary, this part can be expanded to support more complicated
constraints such as dynamic and temporal constraints. Such changes or enhancements
may not affect our access control model.
4.3.3 Some particular constraints
In this section, we discuss how to support some regulations proposed in Section 3 by
defining particular constraints with authorization rules. A related discussion about
process instance-based user group will be given in Section 5.3.
    For Regulation 5 discussed in Section 3.6, we can use the following method. When a
patient exits the hospital after visiting the Gynecology, Venereology, or Psychiatry
Department, he/she should decide if he/she wants to allow his/her healthcare records to
be accessed or not later on by physicians in other departments. We define a security
attribute ArgeeToAccess for that. If he/she agrees, then we use a “yes” as that attribute’s
value; otherwise, we put a “no” in it.
    Another way to support Regulation 5 is to let every patient have a PIN-code/password
for all his/her historical healthcare records in the Gynecology, Venereology, and
Psychiatry Departments. When other physicians hope to access these records, they need
the patient to be present and input his/her PIN-code/password into the system to indicate
his/her approval of such a query. A security attribute Password can be used for this
purpose.
    Privilege propagation is needed in some situations. We have seen such application
requirements in Section 3.4. Now let us see how the model supports that. When a
pharmacist is asked to provide a medicine consultation for a patient, the pharmacist may
obtain different privileges if the consultations come from different physicians.
Example 2. The following 3 tuples are used to represent the privileges of a pharmacist on
three objects (table PHR, HPHR, and IMHR) when performing the MedicineConsulting
task. The definitions of these tables are given in the Appendix. Both PHR and IMHR are
in the current domain, and HPHR is in the historical domain.
1. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, PHR, select);
2. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, HPHR, select, #ThisInstance.PatientID =
PatientID and #Task(Diagnosis)Performer.Role = “Psychiatrist” or
#ThisInstance.PatientID = PatientID and ArgeeToAccess = “Yes”);
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3. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, IMHR, select).
    Here we have two environment variables. One is #Task(Diagnosis)Performer.Role,
which gives the name of the role that the user who executes task Diagnosis plays.
Another is #ThisInstance.PatientID, which is a user-defined variable and gives the
Patient’s ID for the current process instance. The first and third tuples indicate that the
pharmacist can query the healthcare record that is owned by the current process instance.
The second tuple is for a historical record HPHR. #ThisInstance.PatientID = PatientID
and #Task(Diagnosis)Performer.Role = “Psychiatrist” means that if the consultation
seeker is a psychiatrist, then the pharmacist is allowed to check the patient’s historical
record in the Psychiatry department. #ThisInstance.PatientID = PatientID and
ArgeeToAccess = “Yes” means that if the consultation seeker is not a psychiatrist, then
the pharmacist is allowed to check the patient’s historical record in the Psychiatry
department with the agreement from the patient.
5. Implementation issue
In this section, we discuss the implementation of access control mechanisms, based on
the METEOR WfMS consisting of a workflow designer/builder, enactment service and
respository. METEOR’s compresensive workflow model has support for role and
security specification [KFSK99], and its fully distributed enactment services [KSM99,
SK99, IC], support various types of tasks, exception handling, and workflow adaptation.
At build time, we specify data authorization along with other aspects of workflow process
definition. They are kept as metadata and stored in the repository of the workflow system.
    In general, a repository is a persistent object manager with an object model designed to
help users manage descriptions of metadata. A workflow repository is a database of
information about workflow processes, data, organizations and other components of
workflow design such as task realizations, communication protocols, external
applications and resource interfaces. Key advantages of storing workflow design
information in a repository include convenient versioning, lifecycle management,
querying of objects, and sharing design information between various tools.
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5.1 Workflow repository
Part of the workflow repository that is related to authorization and access control is
shown in Figure 5. We use UML (the Unified Modeling Language) to describe them.
                        Figure 5. Some metadata related to authorization and access control
    In Figure 5, there is a one-to-one relationship between the objects of class object (all
of its instances are O, see Section 4.1.3) and meta-object. In class meta-object, every
object includes all the security attributes, ID, and other information of an object of class
object. The class object may include several sub-classes, such as relation, document file
and so on, depending on the requirements of the specific application. Accordingly, there
are corresponding sub-classes in meta-object. For every object o ∈ O in the current
domain, there must be a corresponding object o’ ∈ O in the historical domain, and vice
versa. The Corresponding to relationship between them shows such a relationship
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between two objects. The workflow system maintains invocations for databases or other
kinds of applications.
    The objects of class process indicate all running instances of that process. There is a
Participated by relationship between process and role indicating all participants in a
process instance. Similarly, there is a Participated by relationship between process and
process instance-based user group.
    Almost all the information about users, roles, objects, tasks, user-to-role mapping, role-
to-task mapping, and access control rules is specified at build time by the workflow
designer. However, process and process instance-based user group are two exceptions,
which are created by the enactment service of the WfMS when it starts to run new
instances.
5.2 Creating metadata tables for objects
For every object o ∈ O, we have to create a table to keep its metadata. The metadata of
an object may include many kinds of things, such as identification, type, location,
application invocation, security attributes, and so on of the object. Here we only discuss
attributes of two types-- identification and security attributes. Putting identification of
every element of o in its metadata table can facilitate the one-to-one mapping relationship
between an object and its metadata.
    For every object created in the current domain, we add an attribute ProcessInstanceID
to it for the purpose of access control. Some other security attributes may also be added
according to the application requirement.
5.3 Process instance-based user group
The current domain includes data or files that are generated by running process instances,
so it is possible for us to enforce such an access control rule automatically. In the current
domain, a security attribute ProcessInstanceID is defined for all objects. The value of
ProcessInstanceID for an object denotes the ID of the process instance that owns the
object. In the constraint component of an authorization rule, the following predicate,
ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID, is used for that purpose. Here #ThisInstance.ID is
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a workflow system environment variable, which indicates the ID of the process instance
that the user is working with. ProcessInstanceID is a security attribute variable.
Example 3. In Section 3, Regulation 1 stipulates that only a member of a process
instance-based user group is allowed to access the object owned by that group. For this,
workflow designers can use the following three authorization tuples, among several
others. In this example, we use the role hierarchy shown in Figure 2, and the task
hierarchy shown in Figure 4.
1. (Internist, Diagnosis, IMHR, select),
2. (Internist, Diagnosis, IMHR, update),
3.  (HealthCareProvider, Register, IMHR, insert).
    The definitions of IMHR (Internal Medicine Healthcare Record) and its security
attributes security-attri(IMHR) are given in the Appendix. Because IMHR is in the
current domain, the access control mechanism will add a basic predicate,
ProcessInstanceID = #Thisinstance.ID, to both 1 and 2 above automatically without
human intervention. The same treatment is needed for Example 2 discussed before.
    According to tuples 1 and 2, an internist can check and update the records of the
patient whom he/she is treating when performing the Diagnosis task. The third tuple
indicates that healthcare providers can insert new records for patients in task Register.
5.4 Access control calculation
An access control calculation is the evaluation of a Boolean function B(r, t, o, p, c)—the
permission function—on the identity of role r who asks for the execution of an operation
p on some of the elements of an object o in which c is satisfied in a task t. Because we
use a general structure for different kinds of objects (e.g., relations, files), the same
access control calculation can work for all of them.
    In a WfMS, access requests are issued to users with specified r, t, o, and p. The
following processes are used to determine all the objects allowed to be accessed. First, we
find out all the corresponding access control rules (explicitly given in the repository or
derived ones) about r, t, o, and p: (r, t, o, p, c1), (r, t, o, p, c2), … (r, t, o, p, cn). Second,
we perform the following query operation to the corresponding meta-object table of o in
the repository (suppose the meta-object table of o is called meta-object (o)):
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Select ID(o)
From meta-object (o)
Where c’ and (c1 or c2 or … or cn);
Here ID(o) is composed of the ID attributes of o. If o is a relation in a relational database,
then we can adopt the primary key of it as the ID attributes of meta-object (o). If o is a
set of files, then we can adopt file names as the ID attributes of metadata (o). c’ is the
part which is added automatically by the workflow system to support such as process
instance-based access control or privilege propagation in certain circumstances. Because
only positive authorizations are considered, so (c1 or c2 or … or cn) is used for providing
the union of privileges of those authorization tuples.
    After finishing the query operation, we get a set of object IDs with which the user
wants to operate, and at the same time check that he/she has adequate privilege to do so.
Then, we carry out corresponding processing for different kinds of objects. If o is a
relation in a relational database, we can do a join operation between o and the result table
we get at the second step. If o is a set of files, then we can find the corresponding file
according to the name and category information we get. If o is a special kind of data, then
we need to invoke the corresponding application interface to access it.
5.5 Automatic object migration
We use two domains to store the current and historical data separately. When a process
instance is terminated, all data created in the current domain should be migrated to the
historical domain. This can be done automatically by the workflow system. If o and o’
are two corresponding objects in the current and historical domain, we need to change the
content of meta-object(o) and meta-object (o’). Suppose the related object is o1 ∈ o, we
should delete tuple o1 in meta-object (o) and insert a new tuple o’1 into meta-object (o’).
If o is a file set, that is all. No change is needed for the file itself. If o and o’ are two
corresponding relation tables in current and historical domain, we have to change the
contents of these tables. First we insert tuples into o’:
    Insert into o’
    Select *
    From o
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    Where ProcessInstanceID = #ThisProcess.ID;
Then delete the old ones from o:
    Delete from o where ProcessInstanceID = #ThisProcess.ID;
Such object migration should be performed for every pair of tables that are located in the
current and historical domain, respectively.
5.6 Applicability of this model
Though the implementation is based on METEOR, the model presented in this paper is
general enough to apply to many other WfMSs as well.
    First, all concepts and components used (e.g. user, role, task, process instance, process
instance-based user group, and so on) in our model are common and exist in most
WfMSs. Second, there are two different ways for WfMSs to deal with application data.
One is to manage them directly by the WfMS, another is by using another application
system such as a database system to manage them. The implementation discussed in this
section can deal with both situations (in the latter case, two kinds of application systems,
which are database and file management system, have been considered). For either of the
cases, if we want the data to be protected at the workflow level, the related information
(metadata) of those data needs to be provided, and corresponding access control rules
need to be set in the WfMS. Besides, for those data managed by a database or file
management system, the invocation to the application system needs to be controlled in a
systematic way by the WfMS. Direct entry to the application system should be avoided,
because this will allow the access control protection in the WfMS to be by-passed.
Moreover, using a database (repository) to store those access control metadata and
evaluate access control requests is a good practice. As to some other kinds of legacy
application systems, a general solution may not be available and a case-by-case analysis
is needed for better security solutions. 
6. Conclusions
Significant new access control requirements in workflow applications exist. In this paper,
we used a healthcare workflow application to illustrate these requirements, and presented
an authorization and access control mechanism to support such workflow applications.
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Several important aspects, such as task, role, process instance-based user group, and
object content, were introduced and considered in the model presented. Our approach
used three object domains-- current, historical and exogenous data. This provided the
access control model a clearer structure and higher usability than putting all three
together.
    Key contributions of this paper include the following:
• Through discussion of access control requirements for application data in healthcare
workflow applications, we observe the necessity for WfMSs to provide an access
control mechanism for application data in many situations.
• The concept of process instance-based user group is introduced and has been
identified as an important aspect in the access control model of WfMSs.
• A comprehensive access control mechanism has been provided for application data
used in WfMSs. Four aspects, which are role, task, process instance-based user group,
and data content, are considered in the access control mechanism.
• A classification of application data used in WfMSs is given. Based on that, a general
structure is proposed for handling different kinds of data and files in a unified way.
    The work presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. First, more
sophisticated authorization methods such as negative authorization may be introduced
into the model. Second, how to make it more convenient for the workflow designers to
specify access control rules deserves attention. A graphical tool can be defined for such a
purpose. The third issue is how to support dynamic authorization at run time in a WfMS.
The fourth direction is security solutions for applications of WfMSs across organizational
boundaries. For example, if two or more WfMSs work in a cooperative way, and some of
them use the access control model proposed in this paper, an inter-workflow security
schema needs to be worked out. Because of the diversified nature of application systems,
a case-by-case analysis and solution is needed for each of them for reliable security.
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Appendix: The authorization solution to the example of Section 3
In the following we present an authorization solution to the example in Section 3. Only
two departments that are Internal Medicine and Psychiatry, and four tasks that are Check,
Diagnosis, MedicineDispensing, and MedicineConsultion, are considered. However, that
is enough for us to show how the mechanism works for such applications. 
   The definitions of five tables and their metadata are given. They are HealthCareRecord,
IMHR (Internal Medicine Healthcare Record), PHR (Psychiatry Healthcare Record),
HIMHR  (Historical Internal Medicine Healthcare Record), and HPHR (Historical
Psychiatry Healthcare Record). HealthCareRecord is in the exogenous domain. Both
IMHR and PHR are in the current domain, while HIMHR and HPHR are in the historical
domain. IMHR and HIMHR are corresponding tables in the current and historical
domains, so do PHR and HPHR.
    For both tables IMHR and PHR, which are in current domain, the predicate
“ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID” has been added for every authorization tuple
hare.
HealthcareRcord (Name, SSN, Sex, BirthDate, InsuranceCompany, InsuranceNo,
Address, TelNo); 
meta- HealthcareRcord (SSN, ProcessInstanceID);
IMHR (Name, SSN, Sex, BirthDate, Weight, BloodPressure, PulseRate, Symptom,
Diagnosis, Prescription, nextAppointmentDate, PhysicianName); 
meta-IMHR (ReferenceID, PatientID, PhysicianID, ProcessInstanceID);
HIMHR (Name, SSN, Sex, BirthDate, Weight, BloodPressure, PulseRate, Symptom,
Diagnosis, Prescription, nextAppointmentDate, PhysicianName);  
meta-HIMHR (ReferenceID, PatientID, PhysicianID);
PHR (PatientID, PatientName, PhysicianID, PhysicianName, SSN, Address,
ParentsStative, Sympotom, Diagnosis, Prescription);
meta-PHR (ReferenceID, PatientID, PhysicianID, ArgeeToAccess, ProcessInstanceID);
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HPHR (PatientID, PatientName, PhysicianID, PhysicianName, SSN, Address,
ParentsStative, Sympotom, Diagnosis, Prescription);
meta-PHR (ReferenceID, PatientID, PhysicianID, ArgeeToAccess);
The authorization rules are defined as follows:
1. (Pediatrician, Diagnosis, PHR, select, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
2. (Pediatrician, Diagnosis, PHR, update, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
3. (Pediatrician, Diagnosis, HPHR, select, PhysicianID = #ThisInstance.PhysicianID),
4. (Physician, Diagnosis, HPHR, select, #ThisInstance.PatientID = PatientID and
ArgeeToAccess = “Yes”),
5. (Internist, Diagnosis, IMHR, select, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
6. (Internist, Diagnosis, IMHR, update, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
7. (Internist, Diagnosis, HIMHR, select, PhysicianID = #ThisInstance.PhysicianID”),
8. (Physician, Diagnosis, HPHR, select, #ThisInstance.PatientID = PatientID),
9. (Nurse, Check, PHR, select, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
10. (Nurse, Check, PHR, update, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
11. (Nurse, Check, HPHR, select, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
12. (Nurse, Check, HPHR, update, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
13. (Nurse, Check, IMHR, select, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
14. (Nurse, Check, IMHR, update, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
15. (Nurse, Check, HIMHR, select, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
16. (Nurse, Check, HIMHR, update, ProcessInstanceID = #ThisInstance.ID),
17. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, PHR, select, ProcessInstanceID =
#ThisInstance.ID),
18. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, HPHR, select, ThisInstance.PatientID = Patient.ID
and #Task(Diagnosis).RoleName = “Pediatrician” or “#ThisInstance.PatientID =
Patient.ID” and ArgeeToAccess = “Yes”),
19. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, IMHR, select, ProcessInstanceID =
#Thisinstance.ID),
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20. (Pharmacist, MedicineConsulting, HIMHR, select, ThisPharmacist.Patient_ID =
Patient.ID).
Authorization rules are arranged according to their use in different tasks. Rules 1-8 are
used in the Diagnosis task. Rules 9-16 are for the Check task, and rules 17-20 are for the
MedicineConsulting task. No authorization rule is needed for the MedicineDispensing
task.
